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SHOULD PERSONAL INJURY
DAMAGE AWARDS BE
TAXED?
Mark W. Cochran *
Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code excludes personal injury damage
awards from gross income. However emotionally appealing this exclusion may be,
under the modern definition of gross income personal injury damage awards clearly
constitute an accession to wealth and would, but for the gxclusion provided by section
104(a)(2), be taxable. This Article suggests that section 104(a)(2) is unsupported by
tax theory and, as a tax subsidy, is incapable of equitable application because of
differences in state law. Specifically, Professor Cochran argues that the exclusion is
inconsistent with established principles of taxation and clashes with fundamental tort
policy. Accordingly, the Author advocates the repeal of section 104(a)(2).
I. INTRODUCTION
SECTION 104(a)(2) OF THE Internal Revenue Code excludes
from gross income "the amount of any damages received ... on
account of personal injury or sickness." 1 Originally enacted in
19182, the provision is almost as old as the modem federal income
tax system.3 According to the committee report on the original
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. A.B.J., Univer-
sity of Georgia (1977); J.D., Vanderbilt University (1980); LL.M. in Taxation, University of
Florida (1981).
1. § 104 Compensation for injuries or sickness
(a) In general.-Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of)
deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any
prior taxable year, gross income does not include-
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and
whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or
sickness ....
I.RLC. § 104(a)(2) (West 1987). For a comprehensive discussion of section 104(a)(2), see
Henry, Torts and Taxes, Taxes and Torts: The Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 23
Hous. L. REv. 701 (1986). See also Harnett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 614 (1952)
(discussing I.R.C. § 22(b)(5) (1952), the predecessor to I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), and the policy
reasons for excluding personal injury damages from taxation); Yorio, The Taxation of Dam-
ages: Tax and Non-Tax Policy Considerations, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 701, 706-09 (1977)
("emotional factors behind the exemption").
2. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066 (1919) (codified as amended
at 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1982)).
3. The income tax as we know it today dates from 1913, when the Sixteenth Amend-
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legislation, the exclusion was enacted because it was "doubtful,"
under existing law, whether such damages were required to be in-
cluded in gross income.4 In other words, the Committee perceived
the statutory exclusion as a mere clarification of existing law.
Courts have broadened the concept of gross income significantly
since 1918,' but the statutory exclusion for personal injury damage
awards has survived.6 Absent the exclusion, most damage awards
would constitute gross income under the modem definition.7 Thus,
the original exclusion was based upon what now appears to be an
erroneous assumption.8 To the extent that the original reasoning no
longer supports the exclusion, a search for alternative reasons is ap-
propriate. One might first ask whether there is any basis in "tax
theory" for excluding personal injury damage awards from gross
income.9 If no such basis can be found, the inescapable conclusion
is that the exclusion is a tax subsidy t° -a benefit supported, if at
all, by policy considerations. To the extent section 104(a)(2) repre-
sents a tax subsidy, an inquiry into the reasons for and conse-
quences of the subsidy is appropriate. 1
ment was ratified and Congress enacted the 1913 Income Tax. See R. RICE, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION 2 (1967).
4. The report states:
[u]nder the present law it is doubtful whether amounts received through accident or
health insurance, or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for per-
sonal injury or sickness, and damages received on account of such injuries or sick-
ness, are required to be included in gross income. The proposed bill provides that
such amounts shall not be included in gross income.
H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918).
5. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1025 (1927) (where the Board of
Tax Appeals held that proceeds from the settlement of a slander suit fell outside the definition
of gross income in the absence of a statute requiring inclusion); but see, e.g., Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1955) (gross income includes all "accessions to
wealth" not specifically excluded by statute). For a discussion of prior doctrine which de-
fined income "as the gain derived from capital [or] from labor," see Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U.S. 189, 207 (1920) and Yorio, supra note 1, at 703-06.
6. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (West 1987).
7. Damage awards typically represent an increase in the taxpayer's monetary wealth.
As such, they would be included in gross income under the principle of Glenshaw Glass but
for the exclusion provided by section 104(a)(2). See supra note 5 and accompanying text. See
also Frolik, Personal Injury Compensation as a Tax Preference, 37 ME. L. REv. 1, 40 (1985)
(where the author concludes that "[personal injury] reimbursement represents consumable,
disposable income that is practically and theoretically indistinguishable from [other] taxable
income"); Chapman, No Pain-No Gain? Should Personal Injury Damages Keep Their Tax
Exempt Status?, 9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 407, 408 (1986-87) (citing I.R.C. § 104(a)(2));
infra notes 10-37 and accompanying text.
8. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 12-59.
10. See infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 73-181.
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II. TAX THEORY
Gross income, according to section 61, includes "all income
from whatever source derived" unless another provision specifically
excludes the item in question. 2 Section 104(a)(2) is, of course, such
a specific exclusion.13 While the existence of section 104(a)(2) tradi-
tionally has been justified as a humanitarian gesture,14 more logical
explanations occasionally have been offered. 5 As illustrated be-
low 6 the proffered explanations either rest on erroneous assump-
tions" or do not justify a blanket exclusion.1
A. Return Of Capital
The most familiar justification for the exclusion from gross in-
come of personal injury damage awards is that the recipient is
merely being "made whole" by the award. 9 In tax parlance, being
"made whole" is viewed as a return of capital.20 For example, a
taxpayer buys a share of stock for $100 and later sells the same
share for $100, the taxpayer has no gross income because she is only
recovering her original investment. Recovery of one's original in-
vestment is what is meant by "return of capital."2
The return of capital analysis is appealing, especially in the case
of damages awarded for loss of a limb or organ. This type of injury
graphically illustrates the concept of "human capital."22 The prob-
lem with this analogy is that a return of capital is excluded from
gross income only to the extent of the taxpayer's basis in the capital.
A taxpayer's basis in property is generally the amount paid for the
12. I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 1987). See also supra note 5.
13. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (West 1987).
14. See Harnett, supra note 1, at 626-27.
15. See Henry, supra note 1, at 723-29.
16. See infra notes 19-59 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 19-45 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
19. See, eg., Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1025 (1927) (where the Board of
Tax Appeals concluded that the award received by the plaintiff in a slander suit was merely
"an attempt to make the plaintiff whole," yet stated that "character or reputation or other
strictly personal attributes are not capital .... ") If personal attributes are not capital, then it
follows that compensation for the taxpayer's loss is not a recovery of capital. See infra note
28 and accompanying text.
20. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, at V 2.04, 39-42 (1985).
21. See id., at 2.01, 25.
22. The Solicitor of Internal Revenue articulated the "human capital" concept in a 1920
opinion. Solic. Mem. 1384, 1920-2 C.B. 71, 72 (where the Solicitor disagreed that "the
human body is a kind of capital" and recovery for bodily injury represents "a conversion of
the capital lost through the injury").
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property.23 Any receipt in excess of the taxpayer's basis constitutes
a taxable gain.24 Thus, in the example above, if the taxpayer pays
$100 for stock and sells it for $150, the taxpayer realizes a $50 taxa-
ble gain.25 However, in the personal injury context, a taxpayer's
basis is zero26 because a taxpayer generally does not pay for his
limbs or organs. The recipient of a personal injury damage award is
being "made whole" in the same sense that the taxpayer selling her
stock for $150 is being made whole-by receiving the full value of
what is being given up. Like the taxpayer selling her stock, the per-
sonal injury plaintiff should be allowed to exclude only that portion
of the award that represents recovery of an actual investment of
capital. If the taxpayer's basis in the "capital" cannot be estab-
lished, no part of the award can accurately be called a return of
capital.27 Actually, it is unnecessary to speculate about whether a
taxpayer has a basis in the various parts of his body. A personal
injury damage award does not pay a taxpayer for the damage to his
or her body per se; rather, the taxpayer is compensated for conse-
quent economic loss (i.e., lost earnings) and, in some instances, pain
and suffering.28 Such compensation clearly falls outside the scope
of the return of capital concept, since no capital is being exchanged
for the award.
B. Involuntary Transaction
Even if the plaintiff's recovery cannot accurately be character-
ized as a return of capital, one might be tempted to conclude that
the damage award should not be taxed because of the involuntary
nature of the transaction. After all, the plaintiff did not choose to
be injured.29 The existence of other Internal Revenue Code provi-
sions that grant special status to "involuntary gains" might be cited
23. Section 1012 provides that "[t]he basis of property shall be the cost of such prop-
erty." I.R.C. § 1012 (West 1987).
24. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (West 1987). See also Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144
F.2d 110 (lst Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944). In Raytheon, the court held that
an antitrust recovery for damage to the goodwill of the taxpayer's business could be excluded
from gross income as a recovery of capital but only to the extent of the taxpayer's basis in the
goodwill. Since the taxpayer was unable to establish a cost basis in the goodwill, the entire
award was taxable. Id. at 114.
25. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (West 1987).
26. For an explanation of why a taxpayer has no cost basis in his body, see Frolik, supra
note 7, at 26-27; M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 20, at 2.04, 39-42. The return of capital
analysis is criticized in Yorio, supra note 1, at 711-13.
27. Raytheon, 144 F.2d at 114.
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 901-932 (1977).
29. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 20, at 2.04, 40-41.
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in support of this conclusion. Specifically, section 1033 allows a
taxpayer to postpone recognition of a gain resulting from an invol-
untary conversion of property in certain circumstances. 30  Nor-
mally, if the taxpayer's property is destroyed and the taxpayer is
compensated for the destroyed property (by insurance or other-
wise), the taxpayer will recognize a gain to the extent the compensa-
tion exceeds the basis of the property.31 If the taxpayer invests the
compensation in replacement property, however, section 1033 al-
lows recognition of the gain to be postponed until the taxpayer dis-
poses of the replacement property.32
Section 104(a)(2) 33 might appear to be analogous to section
1033, but there are two important differences. First, section 1033
does not render the gain from an involuntary conversion non-tax-
able. Rather, it merely allows recognition of the gain to be post-
poned.34 Second, in order to qualify for deferral under section
1033, the taxpayer must invest the compensation for the destroyed
property in replacement property.35 By contrast, section 104(a)(2)
provides an absolute exclusion rather than a mere deferral.36 More-
over, the exclusion is not dependent on the taxpayer's use of the
award; she may spend the money any way she likes.37 It would
seem that the personal injury plaintiff is more like the employee
who is wrongfully discharged. The employee did not ask to be fired,
and his firing may have been a breach of the contract under which
he was employed, but the employee is free to spend his damage re-
covery however he sees fit and thus must include it in gross
income.38
30. I.R.C. § 1033(b) (West 1987).
31. Raytheon, 114 F.2d at 113. See also I.R.C. § 1001(a) (West 1987); supra text ac-
companying note 25.
32. Section 1033(b) preserves the gain for later recognition by limiting the taxpayer's
basis in the replacement property to the basis of the destroyed property. I.R.C. § 1033(b)
(West 1987).
33. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (West 1987).
34. I.R.C. § 1033(b) (West 1987).
35. Id.
36. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (West 1987).
37. Section 119 is another example of special treatment for "involuntary income." Sec-
tion 119 excludes the value of meals and lodging from an employee's gross income if they are
provided on the employer's premises, for the convenience of the employer, and, in the case of
lodging, required as a condition of the employee's employment. An explanation offered for
section 119 is that an employee who receives meals and lodging in the course of his or her
employment should not be taxed on the value of accomodations he would not have purchased
if he had a choice. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 20, at 1 1.02, 18-20. Personal injury
damage awards differ because the plaintiff has the free choice to determine how the funds are
spent.
38. See, eg., Gunderson v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 464, 465-66 (1979) (award
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C. Imputed Income
The Internal Revenue Service and the courts have been reluc-
tant to extend the concept of gross income to include so-called "im-
puted income." The generally accepted definition of imputed
income is the "flow of satisfactions from durable goods owned and
used by the taxpayer, or from goods and services arising out of the
personal exertions of the taxpayer on his own behalf."' 39 For exam-
ple, if the taxpayer, a mechanic, repairs her own car, she is enjoying
the fruits of her labor. In an economic sense, the taxpayer has real-
ized an accession to wealth. 4' While such income arguably could be
taxed,41 as a general rule it is not.
Damage awards sometimes represent compensation for the loss
of what would have been imputed income. For example, if a hus-
band is disabled as a result of an accident and his wife is awarded
damages for the loss of the husband's household services, the dam-
age award is a cash substitute for imputed income that would have
been enjoyed tax free. Thus, it could be argued, logic requires that
the damage award also be enjoyed tax free. While this is indeed the
treatment under section 104(a)(2),42 it is far from clear that logic
requires such a result. It is generally agreed that imputed income
escapes taxation for practical rather than logical reasons.43 Specifi-
cally, difficulty in defining and valuing imputed income are the
must be included in gross income); Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 616, 619 (1975) (where
the Tax Court held that damages received on account of discrimination were includable in
gross income because the damages represented back pay); but see, eg., Seay v. Commissioner,
58 T.C. 32, 40 (1972) (holding that a terminated employee could exclude a settlement re-
ceived from his former employer because the settlement was in consideration of the em-
ployee's relinquishment of a defamation claim against the employer); Metzger v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. (CCH) 3000, 3006-12 (1987) (holding that damages received by an
employee in satisfaction of a claim of illegal discrimination, as opposed to a claim for back
pay, were received on account of personal injury and thus excludable under section
104(a)(2)).
The contrasting results in Metzger and Hodge demonstrate that the tax treatment of an
award may depend upon the language used in the pleadings and settlement agreements rather
than the substance of the claim. See Burke & Friel, Defining Personal Injury: The Tax Court
Heals the Taxpayer, 11 REV. OF TAX'N OF INDIVIDUALS, 299, 310-11 (1987). See also infra
notes 73-102 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of state law differences upon
otherwise similarly situated taxpayers).
39. Marsh, The Taxation of Imputed Income, 58 POL. Sc. Q. 514, 514 (1943); see M.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 20, at 1.03, 21-24.
40. McIntyre & Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified
Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV 1573, 1607-24 (1977); see also supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33 (holding that damages for alienation of
affection are excludable).
43. See McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 40, at 1607-24.
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main obstacles to its taxation.44 It appears that these obstacles are
removed when imputed income is reduced to cash .4  Thus, while
damage awards sometimes represent a substitute for non-taxable
imputed income, it does not follow that such awards should be ex-
cluded from gross income on that basis.
D. Administrative Considerations
In addition to the theoretical justifications discussed above, cer-
tain administrative considerations are served by the exclusion of
damage awards from gross income. These considerations are dis-
cussed below.
1. Bunching of Income
A damage award often results in the plaintiff receiving in a lump
sum income that otherwise would have been received over a number
of years. This is especially true of awards compensating the plaintiff
for loss of earning capacity. It might be asserted that it is unfair to
subject such an award to the progressive rate structure of the fed-
eral income tax, since the bunching usually forces the recipient into
a higher marginal rate bracket.46 This problem is avoided, of
course, if the award is not taxed at all. The Tax Reform Act of
198611 lowered the maximum marginal income tax rate for individ-
uals from 50 percent to 33 percent and reduced the number of rate
brackets from 13 to three.48 These chamges greatly reduce the per-
ceived unfairness associated with bunching of income.49 To the ex-
tent that such unfairness continues to exist, some type of rate relief
through averaging5 ° seems a more appropriate remedy than whole-
sale exclusion from gross income.5"
44. Id.
45. See Frolik, supra note 7, at 15-23; but see Yorio, supra note 1, at 713-14.
46. See Frolik, supra note 7, at 23; Yorio, supra note 1, at 714-19.
47. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 1 (1986) (codified as
I.R.C. §§ 1-7872 (1986)) [hereinafter Tax Reform Azt].
48. I.R.C. § 1 (West 1987). The nominal maximum rate is 28 percent, but Code Section
l(g) imposes an additional five percent tax on income within a certain range. Id.
49. Prior to 1981, marginal rates ranged from 14% to 70%. To the extent that it is
perceived as unfair to tax bunched income at a rate higher than the individual is accustomed
to paying, the jump from 11% to 33% should be much less objectionable than the jump from
14% to 70%. Indeed, Congress saw fit to repeal the income averaging provision, which
allowed for some mitigation of the bunching problem in years prior to 1987. I.R.C. §§ 1301-
1305 (1982), repealed by The Tax Reform Act, I.R.C. § 141 (West 1987).
50. See Morris, Taxing Economic Loss Recovered in Personal Injury Actions: Toward A
Capital Idea?, 38 U. FLA. L. RFV 735 (1986); cf I.R.C. § 402(e) (providing for "averaging"
of lump-sum distributions from certain retirement plans).
51. See Frolik, supra note 7, at 11-12.
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2. Medical Expenses
It may be argued that, if damage awards were taxed, plaintiffs
incurring large amounts of medical expenses would be saddled with
tax liability in excess of their ability to pay. Assume, for example,
that plaintiff is injured and incurs $20,000 in medical expenses. If
plaintiff's $20,000 recovery is taxed, he or she will not have enough
to pay both the tax liability and the medical bills. The deduction
for medical expenses provided by section 213 is of no help here,
because medical expenses are not deductible if they are "compen-
sated for by insurance or otherwise."'5 2 Apparently, the tax charac-
ter of the reimbursement is irrelevant.5 3 Thus, even if the damage
award were taxed, section 213 would not allow a deduction for the
medical expenses. 4
Obviously, the medical expense problem is avoided by excluding
the recovery from gross income. If the recovery were taxed, how-
ever, the problem also could be avoided by amending section 213 to
provide that a taxable reimbursement of medical expenses will not
preclude a deduction of those expenses.55
Since the deduction for medical expenses cannot exceed ad-
justed gross income for the year in which the expenses are paid,5 6 a
timing problem could result if the expenses were paid in a year
52. Section 213(a) provides a deduction for "the expenses paid during the taxable year,
not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer ... to the
extent that such expenses exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income." I.R.C. § 213(a) (West
1987).
53. See Litchfield v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 967 (1963), aff'd, 330 F.2d 509 (1st Cir.
1964) (the Tax Court stated that the reference in section 213 to compensation "by insurance
or otherwise" is intended "as a catchall which would require the offsetting of any form of
reimbursement received against the total medical expense payments." (emphasis in the origi-
nal)). Id. at 969. The language from the Tax Court's Litchfield opinion is cited for the
proposition that even a taxable reimbursement will preclude a section 213 deduction in James
& Lowe, Consequences of Maintaining Discriminatory Self-Insured Medical Reimbursement
Plans, 54 J. TAX'N 89, 91 (1981).
54. See James & Lowe, supra note 53, at 91.
55. In the context of taxable reimbursements under discriminatory medical expense re-
imbursement plans, Professor Bittker appears to suggest that the "or otherwise" language of
section 213 does not extend to taxable reimbursements. B. BITrKER, FUNDAMENTALS OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, 1 5.2, 5-12 (stud. ed. 1983). If this reading is correct, the
amendment proposed in text would be a clarification. See also Frolik, supra note 7, at 11 (for
suggested alternatives "which avoid the blanket exemption provided by section 104" in the
medical reimbursement area); supra note 52 and accompanying text.
56. Under section 213, the deduction must be claimed for the taxable year in which the
expenses are paid. Expenses in excess of income cannot be "carried over" to subsequent
years. I.R.C. § 213 (West 1987). Cf § 172, which allows excess business expense deductions
to be carried over and deducted against income for subsequent years. I.R.C. § 172 (West
1987).
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other than the year in which the recovery is received (and, under
our supposition, taxed). For example, if plaintiff recovers a lump
sum in year 1 to cover future medical expenses, the medical ex-
penses might exceed plaintiff's income for the years in which they
are paid. Thus, even if the expenses are otherwise deductible (as a
result of the amendment suggested above), the deduction would be
of no use to plaintiff. A similar problem could arise if plaintiff pays
the expenses in year I (presumably with borrowed money) and re-
covers the award in year 2. This problem does not arise, of course,
if the recovery is excluded from gross income.5 7  If the recovery
were taxed, adding a carryover-carryback 58 feature to section 213
would eliminate the potential problem. 9
III. JUSTIFICATION As A TAX SUBSIDY
The preceding discussion demonstrates why the exclusion of
personal injury damage awards from gross income cannot be justi-
fied as a logical application of tax theory.6° To the extent that such
a justification is lacking, the exclusion should be evaluated as a tax
subsidy. That is, a Congressional decision to forego revenues that
otherwise would be due.6" Although Congress apparently did not
originally intend the exclusion to be a subsidy,62 it functions as such
in the context of modem tax law.
A tax subsidy is an indirect but very real expenditure of public
funds, Congress (at least in theory) having determined that such an
appropriation serves the public interest.63 Typically, tax subsidies
57. In some situations, taxpayers have been able to exclude the reimbursement from
gross income and deduct the expenses. See, e.g., Niles v. United States, 710 F.2d 1391 (1983);
see also infra notes 125-38 and accompanying text.
58. Both carryover and carryback of business loss deductions are provided for by I.R.C.
§ 172 (West 1987) and § 165(i) which allow deductions for certain disaster losses to be taken
for the year preceding the year in which the loss occurred. The purpose of the latter provi-
sions is to give disaster victims an expedited tax benefit to meet an immediate need. A carry-
back provision allows losses that exceed income for the year they are incurred to be deducted
against income for earlier years, typically by filing an amended return. A carryover provision
allows such losses to be deducted in years subsequent to the year they were actually incurred.
59. Any "bunching" problem resulting from including the award in gross income in a
single year could be alleviated by an averaging provision. See supra notes 46-51 and accom-
panying text.
60. For at least thirty-five years, it has been recognized that exclusion of damage awards
from gross income "is rooted in emotional and traditional, rather than logical factors." Har-
nett, supra note 1, at 626.
61. For a thorough discussion on the impact of tax subsidies on Congressional spending
policy, see S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, S.F. TAX EXPENDITURES (1985).
62. Cf supra note 4 and accompanying text.
63. See S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, supra note 61, at 1-6.
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are provided to encourage particular activities that are deemed to be
"desirable." For example, by allowing accelerated depreciation de-
ductions,'" Congress provides an incentive for manufacturers to in-
vest in buildings and equipment, which in turn stimulates the
general economy.65 Other tax subsidies represent government
assistance through reduced tax liability to taxpayers finding them-
selves in unfortunate circumstances. Section 165(c)(3), for example,
allows taxpayers to deduct certain casualty losses66 that would
otherwise be nondeductible personal losses.67
The exclusion provided by section 104(a)(2) 68 compensates tort
victims by allowing receipts that logically should be included in
gross income69 to escape taxation. While an expenditure of govern-
ment funds for the benefit of innocent tort victims has emotional
appeal,7" a closer inspection of the ramifications of the subsidy
reveals that it is not a wise investment of public resources. As ex-
plained below, the subsidy is not fairly allocated. 71 More impor-
tantly, government subsidization of injuries is contrary to sound
tort policy.7
2
A. Allocation Of The Subsidy
Assuming, for the moment, that it is desirable for the govern-
ment to subsidize tort feasors, tort victims, or both,73 it should go
without saying that such a subsidy should be administered fairly
and allocated consistently among those who qualify for its benefits.
However, several recent developments74 indicate that the subsidy is
not administered fairly and consistently. Rather, it is allocated in a
64. See I.R.C. § 168 (West 1987).
65. With respect to the depreciation provisions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, the Joint Committee on Taxation's General Explanation states that "a substantial re-
structuring of depreciation deductions and the investment tax credit would be an effective
way of stimulating capital formation, increasing productivity, and improving the nation's
competitiveness in international trade." Staff of Joint Comm. On Taxation, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., General Explanation of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, at 75 (Comm. Print
1981).
66. In order to be deductible, the loss must result from "fire, storm, shipwreck, or other
casualty, or from theft." I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (West 1987).
67. Section 262 provides that no deduction shall be allowed for "personal, living, or
family expenses." I.R.C. § 262 (West 1987).
68. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (West 1987).
69. See supra note 7.
70. See supra note 60.
71. See infra notes 76-138 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 139-82 and accompanying text.
73. Id.
74. See infra notes 75-138 and accompanying text.
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haphazard fashion that surely would not be tolerated in the context
of a direct government expenditure.
1. Roemer and Threlkeld "75 Definition of Personal Injury
In order to be excluded under section 104(a)(2), damages must
be awarded on account of a "personal injury."76 As is often the
case, it has been up to the courts to define the parameters of the
term. The necessity of judicial interpretation is not unusual, nor is
it an appropriate reason for criticizing a statute. However, two re-
cent cases illustrate the possibility of inconsistent interpretations
arising out of otherwise meaningless differences in state law.
In Roemer v. Commissioner," the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, reversing the Tax Court, 8 held that section
104(a)(2) excludes from gross income damages awarded in a defa-
mation suit, even though the award represented compensation for
injury to the plaintiff's professional reputation.79 In reaching its
decision, the court set out an impressive exposition on the history of
California's defamation law.8 On the basis of this historical back-
ground, the court concluded that defamation is a personal injury in
California. Therefore, damages awarded in such an action are ex-
cluded from gross income for purposes of the federal income tax.8 1
While the result in Roemer may be correct,82 the court's reliance
on state law is troubling. 3 Unfair results are inevitable if, as the
Roemer court held, federal tax consequences turn on state law la-
bels. A plaintiff in state X whose case is factually identical to Mr.
Roemer's and who recovers the same amount of damages might be
denied the benefit of section 104(a)(2) simply because state X does
not label the plaintiff's injury as "personal."
The Tax Court appeared to follow Roemer in James E. Threl-
75. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); 87 T.C. 1294 (1986).
76. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (West 1987); supra note 1.
77. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
78. 79 T.C. 398 (1982).
79. The taxpayer was defamed by an inaccurate credit report issued in connection with
his application for an agency license from Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company. 716 F.2d
at 695. The Tax Court had held that the award was taxable because it represented compensa-
tion for injury to the taxpayer's professional reputation rather than his personal reputation.
79 T.C. at 406-07.
80. 716 F.2d at 697-700. In the court's words, "the law of defamation in California is an
unhappy tangle of illogical rules derived from its haphazard historical development." 716
F.2d at 698.
81. 716 F.2d at 700; I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (West 1987).
82. See Comment, Roemer v. Commissioner, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 211, 249 (1983); Re-
cent Development, 37 VAND. L. REv. 621, 642-43 (1984).
83. See supra note 82.
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keld.8 4 To its credit, the Tax Court emphasized that the label ap-
plied by state law is not determinative of whether a cause of action
is based on a personal injury. 5 Nevertheless, the court analyzed
local law86 and in fact reached its conclusion "[b]ased upon our
review of Tennessee law.",8 7
In light of Threlkeld, s the Ninth Circuit's Roemer 9 opinion
cannot be dismissed as an isolated example of mistaken analysis.
Whether the potential for inconsistent results inheres in the statute
or results from mistaken interpretation, the problem does exist.
Nor is the problem limited to the courts, as the following discus-
sion 9° demonstrates.
2. Revenue Ruling 84-108: Punitive Damages9
According to the Service's position, the exclusion of section
104(a)(2) does not extend to punitive damages. 92 While commenta-
tors generally agree that the Service's position is, in theory, a cor-
rect interpretation of the law,93 the difficulty of distinguishing
punitive from compensatory damages can lead to unusual results.
Revenue Ruling 84-108,1 4 the vehicle for the announcement of the
Service's position, illustrates the potential for inconsistent results
arising out of state law differences. The ruling concerns payments
received by the personal representatives of corporate employees
who were killed in accidents involving corporate aircraft. In order
to receive the payments, which were funded by an insurance com-
pany by arrangement with the employer, the personal representa-
tives were required to release any potential wrongful death claims
against the employer. The ruling addresses identical facts arising in
two different states and concludes that a payment in lieu of damages
recoverable under Virginia law is excludable, while a payment in
lieu of damages recoverable under Alabama law is not excludable.95
The Service based the distinction on the fact that damages under
84. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986).
85. Id. at 1305-06.
86. Id. at 1307.
87. Id.
88. See 87 T.C. 1294 (1986).
89. See 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
90. See infra text accompanying notes 91-102.
91. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
92. Id.
93. See Morrison, Getting a Rule Right and Writing a Wrong Rule: The IRS Demands a
Return on All Punitive Damages, 17 CONN. L. REV. 39 (1984).
94. See Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
95. Id.
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the Alabama wrongful death act are determined solely on the basis
of the degree of fault on the part of the defendant and thus are
"punitive" in nature.96 Virginia law, on the other hand, provides
for damages to be determined according to the actual loss suffered
by the decedent's survivors.9 7 Thus, damages received under Vir-
ginia law are not punitive and therefore are excluded from taxation
by section 104(a)(2).
While Revenue Ruling 84-108 dramatically illustrates the pO-
tential for unfair results under section 104(a)(2), its analysis rests on
firmer ground than that of Roemer98 and Threlkeld.99 In Roemer
and Threlkeld, the courts applied state law to define "personal in-
jury"r-the words of a federal statute."°° In Revenue Ruling 84-108,
the term "person injury" was not in question. Starting from the
admittedly supportable 01 assumption that section 104(a)(2) ex-
cludes damages intended to compensate the plaintiff but not dam-
ages intended to punish the defendant, the Ruling looks to state law
simply to determine the nature of the damages. The analysis is
rigid, but unlike the analyses in Roemer and Threlkeld, it cannot be
called incorrect. °10 Thus, even if Roemer and Threlkeld can be dis-
missed as erroneous, Revenue Ruling 84-108 leads to the conclusion
that a correctly interpreted section 104(a)(2) sometimes yields un-
fair results.
3. Evidence and Jury Instructions
Instructing the jury as to the tax treatment of a damage award
presumably would have an effect on the amount of the award. For
example, if the jury awards the plaintiff $1 million, believing that
the plaintiff will have to pay tax on the award, it could be assumed
that the jury would award something less than $1 million if in-
structed that the award is tax free.10 3 If at least part of the award
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
99. See 87 T.C. 1294 (1986).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89.
101. See Morrison, supra note 93, at 60.
102. But see Morrison, supra note 93, at 47-48.
103. In Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., the court stated that "there is always
danger that today's tax-conscious juries may assume (mistakenly, of course) that the judg-
ment will be taxable and therefore make their verdict big enough so that plaintiff would get
what they think he deserves after the imaginary tax is taken out of it." 443 F.2d 1245, 1251
(3d Cir. 1971). See also Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 346 251 S.W.2d 42, 46 (1952)
(where the Missouri Supreme Court found it "reasonable to assume the average juror would
believe" that damage awards are taxable).
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constitutes a replacement for lost earnings, the size of the award
would also be affected if the defendant is permitted to introduce
evidence of the tax the plaintiff would have paid on those earnings.
In other words, the defendant would want the award to be based on
the plaintiff's "take home pay," while the plaintiff would prefer an
award based on his "gross pay.""
In lawsuits arising under state substantive law, state law deter-
mines whether a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence on taxes
and have the jury instructed that an award is non-taxable.' 0 5 Not
surprisingly, the results are inconsistent from state to state, but
courts in most states do not allow instructions to juries concerning
the tax treatment of potential awards.) °6 The rationale behind the
rule is that a jury instructed to find the actual amount of a plain-
tiff's damages would not normally be expected to go beyond the
given instructions and increase its award to cover the plaintiff's
perceived tax liability.0 7 Moreover, a jury may find that predicting
future tax consequences is too complicated. 108 The minority of
state courts that have allowed evidence and instructions on taxabil-
ity offer the converse rationale, for example, absent such evidence
and instructions the jury might erroneously calculate the amount of
the award, and, believing the award to be taxable, inflate the
amount of the verdict to cover that presumed liability. 0 9 It causes
no harm, the courts reason, to dispel any possible misconceptions
about the taxability of the award. 0
In Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt,'11 the United
States Supreme Court held that an Illinois trial court erred in refus-
ing to allow evidence of tax liability on lost wages and a jury in-
struction on the non-taxability of a potential award under the
104. For example, assume that the plaintiff, prior to being injured, earned $2,000 per
month but took home $1,500 per month after taxes. Assume also that, as a result of the
injury, the plaintiff will be unable to work for two years. The defendant would contend that,
since the damage award is tax free, he should pay plaintiff $36,000 ($1500 x 24 months). The
plaintiff, on the other hand, will claim that he is entitled to $48,000 ($2,000 x 24 months).
See supra text accompanying notes 132-59.
105. Comment, Income Tax Issues in Personal Injury Litigation, 46 MONT. L. REV. 59,
72 (1985).
106. Id. at 72-73. See also Annotation, PROPRIETY OF TAKING INCOME TAX INTO CON-
SIDERATION IN FIXING DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH ACTION, 16 A.L.R. 4th
589, 595 (1982).
107. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 503 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
108. See Comment, supra note 105, at 66.
109. See Annotation, supra note 106, at 602.
110. See, e.g., Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297 (9th Cir. 1975).
111. 444 U.S. 495, 498 (1980).
[Vol. 38:43
DAMAGE AWARD TAXATION
Federal Employers' Liability Act. 2 Writing for the Court, Justice
Stevens observed that absent such evidence and instructions, jurors
would be likely to arrive at an erroneous damage award and further
inflate the amount of the award to take into account the presumed
tax liability." 3 Two dissenting justices argued that allowing such
evidence amounted to appropriation for the defendant a subsidy in-
tended for the plaintiff,I" and that the jury instruction would un-
necessarily confuse the jury."I5
Since the Liepelt decision involved a federal cause of action, it is
not binding for lawsuits based on state law. 16 The extent to which
state courts will follow the Court's lead remains to be seen, but it is
unlikely that a uniform approach will evolve.' As long as differ-
ent states employ different rules, the potential exists for widely va-
rying results. In the Liepelt case, for example, the original award
was $775,000, while the correct amount, under the Court's analysis,
apparently would have been $138,000.11 8 As discussed below, the
result is unsatisfactory under both Liepelt and the majority of state
courts' approach.' 'I Even if it is assumed that one approach or the
other can be deemed "correct," and that section 104(a)(2) serves a
worthwhile purpose,' 20 the potential for such wild variation in ver-
dicts solely because of local rules of evidence and procedure sug-
gests that section 104(a)(2) does not serve its purpose effectively.
4. Niles v. United States:"'2 ' The Double Subsidy
As explained above, medical expenses are deductible except to
the extent the taxpayer is reimbursed for those expenses. 122 If the
award or settlement allocates a specific amount to past or future
medical expenses, the amount allocated to past medical expenses is
included in the plaintiff's gross income to the extent the plaintiff
112. Id.
113. Id. at 497-98. In Liepelt, the jury awarded the plaintiff $775,000. Without regard to
tax consequences, the plaintiff's expert witness estimated the plaintiff's pecuniary loss at
$302,000. If tax consequences were considered, an award of $138,327 would have "made the
plaintiff whole." Apparently, the inflation of the award from $302,000 to $775,000 resulted
from the jury's mistaken belief that the award should be increased to cover taxes. Id. at 491-
92, 497.
114. 444 U.S. at 501-02. (Blackmun, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 502-03.
116. See Comment, supra note 105, at 68-73.
117. Id.
118. 444 U.S. at 491-92.
119. See infra notes 148-75 and accompanying text.
120. Id.
121. 710 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1983).
122. See I.R.C. § 213(a) (West 1987); supra note 52.
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deducted the expenses when they were originally paid. 2 3 Future
medical expenses will be deductible only to the extent such expenses
exceed the amount allocated to them in the award. 124
Problems arise when the award or settlement is a lump sum
with no allocation among the various components. The Service's
position is that a portion of the settlement must be allocated to
medical expenses on the basis of all the facts and circumstances. 125
Once the appropriate amount has been determined, the tax conse-
quences are the same as outlined above. 126 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit rejected the Service's position in Niles v.
United States. 27 In Niles, the taxpayer had recovered a $25,000
verdict against the City of San Rafael, California, as a result of an
injury sustained on the school playground, and a $4,000,000 verdict
against the hospital that was allegedly negligent in treating the in-
jury.'2 8 The jury did not allocate its verdict among the various
components, but on appeal the taxpayer presented an itemization of
the award in response to the defendants' claim that the award was
excessive. 129 That hypothetical itemization allocated $1,588,176 to
future medical expenses and attendant care.130  In a later year,
when the taxpayer claimed a deduction for those expenses, the Ser-
vice denied the deduction because the expenses had been compen-
sated for by the award. The district court held that the medical
expenses were fully deductible,' 3 ' and the court of appeals affirmed,
stating "[m]edical expenses of a taxpayer are not 'compensated for'
within the meaning of I.R.C. [Section] 213(a) by any portion of a
previous lump-sum personal injury award."'' 3 2
The Niles holding results in a double subsidy for the taxpayer.
The award is excluded from gross income, and the expenses the
award compensates for are deductible. Setting aside the question of
whether a subsidy for medical expenses is appropriate, 133 subsi-
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(g)(1) (as amended in 1979).
124. Rev. Rul. 75-232, 1975-1 C.B. 94.
125. Rev. Rul. 79-427, 1979-2 C.B. 120.
126. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
127. 710 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1983).
128. Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1974).
129. Id. at 241, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
130. Id.
131. Niles v. United States, 520 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 710 F.2d 1391 (9th
Cir. 1983).
132. 710 F.2d at 1395.
133. See Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309,
331-43 (1972); Newman, The Medical Expense Deduction: A Preliminary Postmortem, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 787 (1980).
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dizing them twice is a waste of public funds. Nevertheless, such a
result is inevitable unless the Service's position134 is followed. The
problem with the Service's position, as pointed out by the Niles
court, 135 is that it requires speculation as to what portion of an
award represents compensation for medical expenses. 136 The Ninth
Circuit's rule, on the other hand, creates the potential for radically
different results for similarly situated taxpayers solely on the basis
of whether the jury itemizes its verdict. 137 The problem could be
solved by taxing the award and allowing a deduction for the medi-
cal expenses, even though "compensated for," provided the com-
pensation is included in gross income.138
B. Tort Policy
The primary function of the tort system is cost allocation. 139 In
appropriate circumstances,"4 the cost of an injury is shifted from
the injured party to the party causing the injury.' 4 ' Presumably,
the party causing the injury passes the cost on to its customers, em-
ployees, and other constituents. 42 This allocation of cost has the
secondary effect of regulating conduct. In theory, if the accident
costs associated with an activity exceed the benefits derived from
the activity, people will find a safer way of engaging in the activity
or abandon it altogether. '1 3 This line of analysis is suggested by
Judge Hand's definition of negligence in United States v. Carroll
134. Rev. Rul. 79-427, 1979-2 C.B. 120.
135. 710 F.2d at 1394.
136. Presumably, the plaintiff/taxpayer would have presented evidence supporting each
component of the damage award. In most cases, this evidence should provide a reliable basis
for allocating a lump sum award. This was, in fact, the methodology suggested by the gov-
ernment in Niles. 710 F.2d at 1392.
137. An itemized verdict would fall squarely within the rule of Rev. Rul. 75-232, 1975-1
C.B. 94. Thus, the court of appeals is suggesting that the plaintiff/taxpayer is entitled to
deduct all of his future medical expenses if the verdict is unallocated and none of his future
medical expenses if the verdict is allocated. The Niles decision is criticized as a frustration of
Congressional policy in Note, Niles v. United States: Double Tax Benefits Arise From the
Ninth Circuit's Questionable Interpretation of Section 213, 4 VA. TAX REV. 427, 438-39
(1985).
138. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
139. "The law of torts... is concerned with the allocation of losses arising out of human
activities." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (5th ed. 1971).
140. Liability typically is based upon fault (i.e., negligence), but tort doctrine sometimes
provides for strict liability. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 139, at 534-83.
141. See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) (for a comprehensive analysis of risk distribution theory); Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 34 (1972) (for "the hypothesis that liability for
negligence is designed to bring about an efficient level of accidents and safety").
142. Calabresi, supra note 141, at 500-01.
143. Posner, supra note 141, at 32.
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Towing Co.,'" which suggests that conduct is negligent if the cost
of a potential injury, multiplied by the likelihood of that injury oc-
curring, exceeds the burden of taking precautions adequate to pre-
vent the injury. 145
Regardless of whether one subscribes to the interpretation of
Judge Hand's standard as a law of economics, 146 it must be con-
ceded that the tort system discourages reckless conduct and encour-
ages the safest manner, within reason, of carrying out worthwhile
activities. 47 The following discussion explores the impact of sec-
tion 104(a)(2) on the cost allocation and regulatory functions of the
tort system.
As outlined above, a personal injury damage award represents
an accession to wealth not inherently different from any other and
therefore logically should be included in gross income.' 48 Accord-
ingly, taxation of the award will be treated as the "correct" result
and used as a basis for evaluating various alternative results that are
possible under the present rule of excluding the award from gross
income. 149
Let us assume that a plaintiff has been injured as a result of a
defendant's negligent 15  conduct. The plaintiff's lost wages, lost
earning capacity, and pain and suffering have a total value of
$100,000.151 If the jury awards the plaintiff $100,000, plaintiff's
wealth has been increased by $100,000 and defendant has been as-
sessed with the cost of the injury he caused. 5 2 Since the plaintiff
has been enriched, he should pay tax the same as if he had earned
the money. 153 For simplicity, a 28 percent rate will be assumed.' 54
144. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
145. Id. at 173.
146. See Posner, supra note 141.
147. Judge Posner suggests that the negligence system results in an allocation of accident
costs in a manner that encourages economic efficiency. In other words, potential defendants
are encouraged to take safety precautions so long as the cost of those precautions is less than
the potential cost of an accident, taking into account the likelihood of an accident occurring.
Posner, supra note 125, at 32-33. By denying compensation for avoidable accidents, the doc-
trine of contributory negligence encourages potential plaintiffs to take reasonable precautions.
Id. at 39-40.
148. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note I and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
151. The plaintiff's medical expenses will be disregarded on the assumption that a deduc-
tion under section 213 would offset any inclusion in gross income. See supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
152. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 7, 10-37 and accompanying text.
154. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the maximum marginal rate for individuals is
33 percent, but the maximum effective rate is 28 percent. See supra notes 47-48.
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Thus, plaintiff will owe $28,000 in tax, leaving plaintiff with
$72,000, the proper "after tax" recovery.
Situation #1 - The Typical Result Under Current Law
On the facts outlined above,' the result under current law is
that the plaintiff gets to keep the entire $100,000 instead of paying
$28,000 in tax. The cost to defendant, $100,000, is the same. Plain-
tiff is receiving an extra $28,000, which ultimately comes, of course,
from the federal government."5 6 This is objectionable for a number
of reasons. First, allowing the federal government to contribute to-
ward the cost of injuries is contrary to the basic premise of tort law:
that the party negligently 5 7 causing the injury should bear its cost.
If the public desires a government-funded accident insurance pro-
gram, Congress should address the idea directly."5 8 A subsidy to
the plaintiff also creates economic distortions. First, the plaintiff is
being told that $10 of compensation for lost wages is worth $14 of
income earned on the job.'59 This is economically unsound. In ad-
dition, if an injury with a true after tax economic value of
$72,000160 will net an after tax return of $100,000, the $28,000 pre-
mium adds an incentive to pursue questionable claims.16' Finally, if
155. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
156. This $28,000 of foregone revenue is properly viewed as a tax subsidy. See supra
notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
158. In THE COMMON LAW, Oliver Wendell Holmes comments negatively on the pros-
pect of state sponsored accident insurance:
The state might conceivably make itself a mutual insurance company against
accidents, and distribute the burden of its citizens' mishaps among all its members.
There might be a pension for paralytics, and state aid for those who suffered in
person or estate from tempest or wild beasts. As between individuals it might adopt
the mutual insurance principle pro tanto, and divide damages when both were in
fault, as in the rusticumjudicium of the admiralty, or it might throw all loss upon
the actor irrespective of fault. The state does none of these things, however, and the
prevailing view is that its cumberous and expensive machinery ought not to be set in
motion unless some clear benefit is to be derived from disturbing the status quo.
State interference is an evil, where it cannot be shown to be a good. Universal
insurance, if desired, can be better and more cheaply accomplished by private
enterprise.
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 96 (1881).
159. If the plaintiff earns $14 in wages, he will be left with $10.08 after paying tax at the
rate of 28%. Professor Yorio concludes that non-taxability of damages based on lost earnings
results in overcompensation of the plaintiff but suggests that taxation of an award for pain
and suffering would result in undercompensation of the plaintiff. See Yorio, supra note 1, at
733-35.
160. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
161. Cost efficiency analysis can be applied here also. If X represents the cost of litiga-
tion, plaintiff can be expected to pursue a claim if L (the likelihood of recovery) times R (the
amount that can be recovered) exceeds X. If R is increased (as here, through a tax subsidy),
the value for L at which plaintiff will pursue his claim is correspondingly decreased.
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an injury will yield compensation in excess of the actual loss, there
is, at least in theory, an economic incentive to become an accident
victim. 162
Situation #2 - The Jury Inflates the Award
to Cover Imaginary Taxes
Let us assume the same facts outlined above except that the
jury, erroneously believing that the award will be taxed, increases
the award to $139,000 to allow for the taxes. 163 Now the plaintiff,
who should end up with $72,000 after taxes," walks away with
$139,000 tax free. Of the extra $67,000, the defendant pays $39,000
and the federal government pays $28,000. The message to the
plaintiff is the same as in Situation # 1,165 only louder. The plaintiff
now learns that $10 of compensation for lost wages is worth $19 of
wages earned on the job,166 or, put another way, sitting at home
injured for one month pays the same as working for two months.
The incentive to pursue questionable claims 167 and the premium on
becoming an accident victim 168 are correspondingly increased.
On the other side of the equation, the defendant is now being
charged $139,000 for a $100,000 injury. Although the extra
$39,000 was not intended to be a punitive damage award, it func-
tions as one. If this scenario is repeated often enough, the defend-
ant will be driven out of business without economic justification. 169
Situation #3 - The Jury Reduces the Award
Because It is Tax Free
Once again, let us assume that defendant has negligently caused
a $100,000 injury to plaintiff. This time, however, assume that the
162. Admittedly it is unrealistic to assume that a person would intentionally incur a bod-
ily injury. A more appropriate statement would be that the subsidy decreases the potential
plaintiff's economic incentive to take reasonable precautions. See Posner, supra note 141, at
40.
163. Such an assumption is not unfounded. See supra note 113. The $139,000 represents
the amount that, if taxed at 28%, would leave $100,080 after tax.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 150-54.
165. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
166. If imaginary taxes of 28 percent are added, the $10 award is increased to $14 ($14 X
72 % = $10). The $19 of wages would have an after tax value of $13.68 ($19 x 72 % =
$13.68).
167. See Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 495 (1980) and text accom-
panying note 161.
168. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
169. Under cost efficiency analysis, an activity ceases to be economically viable if the cost
of the injuries resulting from the activity exceeds the benefits to be derived from the activity.
See Calabresi, supra note 141, at 502.
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jury knows its award is tax free and therefore reduces the award to
$72,000 on the theory that the plaintiff is receiving an indirect sub-
sidy of $28,000 from the federal government. 7 ° Under this scena-
rio, plaintiff walks away with the correct amount - $72,000.171
The defendant, however, has caused a $100,000 injury and is paying
only $72,000. Quite simply, the jury has taken the $28,000 govern-
ment subsidy away from the plaintiff and given it to the defendant,
converting the section 104(a)(2) exclusion into a pure, government-
funded insurance program.1 72 This conversion frustrates the regu-
latory function of the tort system. 173 When the cost of an accident
to the defendant is reduced through a government subsidy, the eco-
nomic incentive to avoid an accident is reduced.174 In legal terms,
the standard of care is lowered.
1 75
Situation #4 - The Award is Taxed But the Jury Erroneously
Assumes It Is Tax Free
Finally, one should consider what happens if the award is taxed,
but the jury erroneously assumes that it is tax free and therefore
reduces the amount of the award. As outlined above, 17 6 the "cor-
rect" result is achieved if the award is taxed and the jury ignores tax
considerations in arriving at the amount. Under that scenario, the
defendant pays the full cost of the injury and the plaintiff gets to
keep his or her "fair share."'177 If, however, the award is taxed and
the jury reduces the amount believing it is tax free, the situation is
as egregious as any of the other possibilities discussed above. Using
the same dollar amounts, if the jury found that the defendant
caused $100,000 worth of damage, but reduced the award to
$72,000 thinking it was tax free, the defendant would pay less than
the "correct" amount. As stated above, reducing the cost of the
accident to the defendant reduces the standard of care.'78 At the
same time, the plaintiff is not adequately compensated. Instead of
the correct recovery of $72,000, the plaintiff is left with only
$51,840 after tax.'79 Besides the unfairness of undercompensation
170. Admittedly, this result is unlikely unless the jury is comprised of economists and tax
professors.
171. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 150-54.
177. Id.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 173-75.
179. At a 28% rate, tax on $72,000 would be $20,160.
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on an individual basis, repeated undercompensation of plaintiffs
would reduce the incentive to sue and thus frustrate the regulatory
function of the tort system.18
0
The preceding examples illustrate that regardless of how the
jury deals with the tax character of a non-taxable award,18' eco-
nomic distortions and frustrations of tort policy are inevitable. The
inescapable conclusion is that an exclusion of damage awards from
gross income is fundamentally unsound from a tort policy
standpoint. 182
Even if awards were taxed, distortions could still result if the
jury were not properly instructed. 83 In the case of a taxable award,
the logically correct instruction would be none at all, since tax con-
siderations should be ignored. This assumes, however, that the jury
will not engage in misguided speculation as to tax consequences.
The potential consequences of such speculation, as illustrated
above,18 4 warrants a cautionary instruction to the jury that they
should not consider the effect of income taxes in arriving at the
amount of the award.
IV. CONCLUSION
The exclusion of personal injury damage awards from gross in-
come is inconsistent with established principles of taxation.'
85
Damage awards cannot accurately be characterized as a return of
capital. '86 Nor does the involuntary nature of the transaction jus-
tify the exclusion.'" 7 While so-called imputed income is not taxed,
180. See supra text accompanying notes 143-47.
181. See supra notes 103-20 and accompanying text.
182. According to Professor Bittker, repeal of section 104(a)(2) "would no doubt lead to
larger verdicts and higher insurance premiums." B. BI-rKER, supra note 55, at 5.1, 5-5.
See also J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 184-85 (6th ed. 1987); Yoriosupra note 1, at 719-22 (suggesting that jurors would
also increase the award since the plaintiff would be taxed at a higher rate). While the predic-
tion probably is accurate, an attempt to justify section 104(a)(2) on cost containment grounds
ignores the fact that under current law, the cost of an accident includes not only the judgment
paid by the defendant but also the tax subsidy paid by the government. See supra notes 61-72
and accompanying text. Repeal of the exclusion would not increase the total cost of acci-
dents; it would merely relieve the tax-paying public of its share of the cost and reallocate that
share to the parties involved in the accident. See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
Any resulting increase in insurance premiums would merely be a reflection of the true cost of
the accident, part of which is currently hidden by virtue of the tax subsidy.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 103-07.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 176-80.
185. See supra note 60.
186. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
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the reasons supporting its non-taxability do not extend to damage
awards representing a cash substitute for such income. 88 Exclud-
ing damage awards avoids certain administrative problems that may
otherwise arise, but those problems could be resolved by less drastic
means. 189
Absent a logical explanation based on tax theory, the exclusion
of damage awards must be viewed as a tax subsidy-a decision
(conscious or otherwise) to forego revenue that otherwise would be
due.' 90 Because of definitional, evidentiary, and choice of law
problems, the subsidy afforded by section 104(a)(2) is unfairly ad-
ministered. 191 More importantly, government subsidization of acci-
dent costs is inconsistent with tort policy objectives.' 92
There appear to be few, if any, valid reasons for the existence of
section 104(a)(2). 193 The reasons for its repeal appear numerous
and persuasive.194 If damage awards were taxed, the policy goals of
the tort system would be advanced rather than frustrated, since de-
fendants would not be under-penalized and plaintiffs would not be
overcompensated. 195 In order to assure this result, however, juries
should be cautioned to ignore tax consequences in determining the
amount- of awards. 196
188. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 73-138 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 139-73 and accompanying text.
193. But see B. BITTKER, supra note 182.
194. Professor Frolik reaches a similar conclusion. See generally, Frolik, supra note 7, at
40 ("[rjepeal of [section 104] would allow the sympathy for the injured and disabled to focus
on appropriate and selective deductions rather than forming the basis for over-broad exemp-
tions .... ").
195. See supra text accompanying notes 149-83.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 181-83.
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